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Iran, the largest country in the Persian Gulf and member of President George W. Bush's "Axis of Evil," 
perplexes many astute observers of international relations. Iran became the first Islamic theocracy in the 
world promising its inhabitants the benefits of divinely guided social justice and prosperity. Twenty-four 
years later, none of these benefits have materialized. A variety of public opinion polls over the last 18 
months show widespread discontent within the Islamic Republic led by the valy-e faqih (Supreme Leader) 
Ali Khamanei. Given the increasing discontent in Iran, can we expect the Islamic Republic to endure in its 
current state for the foreseeable future?  
As the United States considers the policy conundrums presented by such issues as whether and/or how 
to promote regime change in Tehran and how to address Iran's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
program, there is a model that can help explain the ways in which the theocratic state can succumb to 
civil unrest inside the country. The model is based on the conclusions drawn by a social scientist and 
scholar of revolutions and political discontent, Theodore Robert Gurr whose 1970 book, Why Men Rebel, 
analyzes how discontent can be politicized leading to violence against the regime. Gurr's framework 
starts with the people first focusing their discontent against the regime's institutions, personalities and 
policies. This leads to the theory of Relative Deprivation— the people's perceived discrepancy between 
two values: reality and capabilities. If the discrepancy reaches a given magnitude, political violence is 
likely because the people will find relief in venting their anger since other means of recourse are 
apparently closed to them.[1]  
Gurr matches the capability of dissidents to rock the foundations of the establishment against the latter's 
resilience, called the coercive balance. The dissident capability to shake the foundations of the 
establishment is mentioned because when studying social uprisings, the fall of the established powers is 
never guaranteed unless it is being studied post facto. The last element in Gurr's analysis is the end state. 
Will the regime collapse, be overthrown, or remain in power? Arriving at an end state directly flows from 
the tension inherent in the coercive balance. How does this apply to present day Iran? 
Institutions, Personalities, and Policies 
Iranian society has focused its discontent towards the institutions, personalities and policies which have 
set the country on its present course, namely the valy-e faqih (Council of Guardians), bonyads (Islamic 
charitable foundations), and the basiji (organized band of government sponsored thugs). The 
personalities are current valy-e faqih, Ayatollah Ali Khamanei and President Mohammed Khatami. The 
policies in this case are suffocating controls on social freedom, and the continued overt animosity towards 
the United States. 
The valy-e faqih according the creator of the position, Ayatollah Khomeini, constitutes the representative 
of the twelfth Imam on earth. Iran, home to most of the world's Shi'a, must be ruled in his name.[2] In 
1978-79, a popular consensus developed to overthrow the Shah, but there was no agreement as to who 
would replace him. After the Shah stepped down, a chaotic period ensued until Khomeini consolidated his 
position after the hostage crisis in November 1979. The Shi'a clergy represented the only cohesive 
organization opposing the Shah that had the three most important ingredients for a successful social 
movements: ideology (Islam), leadership (Khomeini), and institutions (mosques). While Khomeini was a 
charismatic and learned cleric, he was not a Grand Ayatollah. Nonetheless, Khomeini possessed the 
religious credentials and political expertise necessary of a valy-e faqih.[3] Khomeini's death soon revealed 
the institutional fragility of the valy-e faqih. His successor Khamanei lacked the appropriate religious 
credentials but had political expertise. Khamanei has therefore been a very shrewd politician, but as valy-
e faqih the spiritual path of Iran is in question because he does not live up to Khomeini's reputation.[4] 
This is a problem with charismatic dictators because one cannot expect the next ruler to be of equal 
caliber to the predecessor. 
In Iran's system, the Council of Guardians selects candidates for public office. There are two important 
criteria for selection as a political candidate, the first being "practical adherence to Islam", and the second, 
"acceptance of the concept of valy-e faqih and commitment to the political system." As their name 
suggests, the Council has been the staunchest protector of the revolution. In 1997 only four candidates 
were allowed to run for president out of the 230 that applied.[5]  
The third important institution in Iran are bonyads, or charitable religious foundations. They are the 
interface between the Iranian people who being predominantly Muslim, must practice the fourth pillar of 
Islam, called zakat, in which Muslims are required to give a portion of their income to charities. Bonyads 
such as the Foundation for the Oppressed, Martyrs Foundation, and War Wounded own collectively over 
100 billion dollars in assets and control over 40 percent of the non-oil sector of the Iranian economy. 
There is a very low rate of private capital accumulation in Iran and the foundations are one of the few 
means the government has at its disposal for internal economic investment.[6] The bonyads are a major 
economic impediment to the diversification of the Iranian economy. Iran has experienced significant 
contraction in its economy. In 1977, the gross national product (GNP) was 85 billion dollars shrinking to 
82 billion dollars in 1986. In 2001, the Iranian GDP was valued at 115 billion dollars. If the 1986 figures 
were transposed to 2001, the GDP would have to be valued at $135 billion. Stated another way, the 
Iranian economy has lost one seventh of its value in real terms over the last 24 years.[7] The bonyads 
stifle entrepreneurs and the bazaaris not affiliated with bonyads suffer because the latter dominate the 
export and import businesses. Thanks to their status as Islamic charities, the bonyads are tax-exempt 
and receive favorable exchange rates.[8]  
The basiji are religious inspired thugs who act on behalf of the clerics with the bonyads as their key 
sponsors. The basiji are not centrally controlled from Teheran, but command is outsourced to local 
mosques that are accountable to the valy-e faqih. The basiji supplanted the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 
Corps (IRGC) after it refused to suppress the 1994 Ghazvin riots. The basiji was deployed quelling the 
riots there and in Teheran in 1999 and 2003 became the regime's "storm troopers" receiving generous 
allowances from the government. Forty percent of the vacancies at universities are reserved for basiji. 
This is substantial given their suspect academic qualifications. The basiji are a vital constituency for the 
present regime, which goes out of its way to keep it loyal.[9]  
The key personalities are Ali Khamanei because of his suspect religious credentials and President 
Khatami, the reform minded president elected in 1997 and 2001. Both the position of valy-e faqih and its 
occupant are despised by many Iranians. President Khatami did not convert his overwhelmingly popular 
mandate to produce concrete reforms. Ironically, his landslide elections were manipulated by the mullahs 
to validate the valy-e faqih system due to the large turnout. Although Khatami is popular abroad, he has 
not been able to use his popularity to bring the clerics to a crossroads.[10]  
In the public policy arena, the lack of social freedom especially for women remains an acute source of 
discontent. Iran differs from its Arab neighbors in that women are active participants in the work force.[11] 
Their mobilization in the work place contrasts with significant social restrictions and diminished 
opportunity in a saturated job market.  
The last policy aspect is the collision course between the Iranian theocracy and the United States. The 
average Iranian does not bear ill will against America, as evidenced in the large turnout for a pro-America 
rally to sympathize with the victims of 9/11. The animosity brought about by the Iranian government's 
sponsorship of terrorism is devastating to Iran's economy because much needed American expertise and 
capital for the oil sector is unavailable and the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 limits the amount of 
investment from other nations.[12]  
Relative Deprivation 
The mullahs have either willingly or reluctantly given Iran what Gurr would call societal conditions that 
increase the average level or intensity of expectations without increasing capabilities thus increasing the 
amount of discontent.[13] Some of the contradictions can be considered critical variables in Relative 
Deprivation (RD) theory. Different parts of the Iran populace are affected. The bazaaris, for example are 
one such bloc. During the Shah's reign, they were undercut by large foreign retailers. When the mullahs 
came to power, the bazaaris not allied with bonyads were weakened because in the import-export 
business, they have to pay market prices for hard currency whereas the bonyads and partners trade at 
the much cheaper official rate. Before 1979, lucrative business was reserved for the Shah's associates, 
and there has been little change since the bonyads have supplanted the latter.[14] To make matters 
worse, Khomeini told people to have more children during the 1980's because of the tremendous losses 
in the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88). These children have come of age and in their most productive years there 
are few jobs and many seek to emigrate.[15]  
Sanctions by the United States further complicate economic life for the mullahs. Iran has a $23 billion 
external debt against reserves of $15 billion. Because the United States has the most votes in the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Iran has difficulty borrowing money. It also cannot deal with the Paris 
Club of Bankers, therefore, Iran must make separate financing agreements with about 20 countries 
thereby increasing costs.[16] By allowing the bonyads to use the official foreign exchange (forex) rate, the 
mullahs are forced to operate at a net loss. This will in the future lead to a diminished ability to patronize 
the bonyads to which many basiji are outsourced. It is therefore in U.S. interests that Iran has little access 
to foreign capital. The lack of capital accumulation curtails entrepreneurship which can employ the 
thousands of high school and university graduates flooding the job market. By creating an uneven playing 
field in the bazaar, the mullahs have imposed a handicap upon themselves which really propagates 
discontent that they must deal with.  
On the political front, people need to feel pride in their leaders and country. The valy-e faqih is 
accountable to God and is above all politics; the ultimate arbiter of right and wrong.[17] Khomeini's heirs 
lack his legitimacy and appeal and since the whole valy-e faqih concept was based on that, a significant 
prerequisite for political upheaval has been met because the regime is immobile and inflexible. The 
clerics act mostly to preserve their own power therefore becoming a barrier to change.[18] The proportion 
of political elite (mullahs) to political participants is very low. If the regime fails to respond to pressures for 
reform, participatory RD increases to a point where violence is directed towards the establishment. In the 
Hashemi Aghajari controversy, the great upheaval surrounding his death sentence made the decision 
float from appeal to appeal because of the mullahs' reluctance to face the consequences of his 
execution.[19] This is what can be explained in RD theory as the last resort that transforms a legitimate 
form of government (because of the mullahs' claim of popular validation through elections) into an 
illegitimate institution.[20]  
It is difficult to live within the confines of "divine legitimacy" when it is clear that those who consider 
themselves God's messengers are flawed. This is accentuated by the state deciding upon the definition of 
the Almighty. Hence a serious condition where the valy-e faqih operating as the ultimate authority and 
accountable to nobody.[21] The Iranian situation gives Iranians a sense of helplessness and a need for 
reckoning. The longer the reconciliation is delayed, the greater the violence needed to settle them. In 
Iran's case, violence is likely because the clergy which shielded the people from the government's 
arbitration is now oppressor. If the clerics leave power peacefully they regain a medium of credit and trust 
which may permit their return.[22]  
The Iranian Coercive Balance 
Coercive Balance is the potential for force and counterforce during prolonged periods of civil unrest. 
Recent events such as the intense rioting in June 2003 inspired by Los Angeles based satellite TV and 
the Aghajari controversy show that the clerics may have lost the upper hand. In these riots, the rioters 
actively confronted the state's forces. The mullahs had no choice but to use force to repress the dissent. 
Gurr's cycle of force and counterforce is thus observed.[23] Force is resident with the dissident movement 
in Iran because they are the agents of change while counterforce is associated with the regime because 
they must respond to popular instigation. Scholars of social revolution agree that for change to occur, the 
regime must suffer a general military breakdown. Dissidents cannot prevail against a well disciplined, led, 
and funded force. To be successful, incumbents and dissidents must have ideology, leadership, and 
institutions.[24]  
The mullahs are not a monolithic bloc because many of them oppose the regime including Ali Montazeri, 
at one time was Khomeini's successor. The ruling mullahs have three different factions based on ideology. 
The Line of the Imam (LOI) who are Khomeini's most faithful supporters advocate exporting the revolution. 
Prominent during Khomeini's rule, they fell out of favor with Khamanei because he was insecure and 
wanted a subdued LOI. The next religious faction is the Combatant Clergymen Association (CCA) which 
came to prominence when President Rafsanjani (1989-1997) broke with Khamanei because the Supreme 
leader merged the komiteh, IRGC, and the Gendarmerie in 1992. Khamanei did this because he could 
not control multiple factions as Khomeini could. The security services merger alienated Rafsanjani from 
Khamanei because LOI members were purged. The CCA controls the most important bonyads and are 
the biggest sponsors of the basiji. The last faction is the Servants of Construction (SOC) led by Ali 
Rafsanjani, a very influential mullah also known for his prolific corruption. The SOC controls the Central 
Bank and IRNA, Iran's official news agency.[25]  
Iranian dissidents are very fragmented and range from monarchists to the notorious Mujaheddin Khalq 
(MEK) which was allied with Saddam Hussein. The virtual elimination of social freedoms make it hard for 
Iranians to be team players for any cause. The opposition is very fragmented, not unlike the opposition to 
the Shah. There is a yearning for a charismatic leader who can unify the opposition but as witnessed with 
Khomeini, this is not a desirable track. The lack of dissident unity makes them prone to targeting by 
Iranian security forces.[26] 
The balance seems lopsided in the mullahs favor, however, the sub theory of fleeting versus consistent 
compliance must be taken into consideration. Consistent compliance is preferable because the 
leaderships directives are followed at the penalty of sanction. Parallel to discipline and cohesion for 
security services. With fleeting compliance, the regime's coercive functions are not standardized and 
loyalties are suspect for example, the IRGC voting for Khatami in 1997.[27] To fix fleeting compliance 
sanction or patronage must be imposed or a more loyal group enhanced. Patronage raises a vulnerability 
because if the money runs out, the regime looses the basiji.  
End Game 
The magnitude of unrest can be described as internal war, turmoil, or conspiracy. Internal war is an all out 
civil war between factions with even coercive capability. Turmoil is a slow approach taken when the 
balance is lopsided in the regime's favor and the opposition lacks organization. In a conspiracy, the 
balance favors the incumbent but the dissidents are organized and the regime has a specific vulnerability 
that can be exploited. This is unlikely in Iran because the mullahs are fragmented but will unify to protect 
their interests. Coercive balance can be settled in two ways, one group either runs out of resources or 
attains the capacity of genocidal victory over its opponents. The latter was the case in Saddam's Iraq 
where the balance was totally in his favor. For that to happen, the people must be destitute enough to 
give up dissidence because they are preoccupied with subsistence.[28] Iran is not in such a situation and 
the dissident movement is a low cost operation goaded by the internet and Los Angeles based satellite 
TV which ties up the mullahs coercive apparatus at considerable expense.  
Regime change is accomplished by either a collapse or overthrow. Overthrow requires success in an 
internal war or conspiracy. Since these two options are difficult to foresee in Iran, regime collapse is the 
most viable option. Increasing reliance on the basiji and patronage has made co-option the bond between 
the ruling clerics and the enforcers. A serious downturn of the Iranian economy could cause an erosion of 
loyalty from the basiji, IRGC, and the military. Another factor seldom mentioned is the civil service which 
helps make the state governable. If significant numbers of civil servants go uncompensated for a 
prolonged periods, acute paralysis may overcome Iran leading to the regime's collapse. 
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